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consensus has been reached by the European Parliament in favour of the proposed 
Payment Services Directive (PSD), and the proposed legislation is due to be adopted shortly 
by the EU Council, following two years of intensive negotiations. The proposed directive is 
an ambitious effort to create a single EU-wide market for electronic (cashless) payments, in 
particular credit transfers, direct debit and card payments. With a common set of rules applicable 
to all payment services in the Union, it is intended to make cross-border payments between member 
states as easy and efficient as national transactions. The proposed Directive seeks to simultaneously 
enhance product quality and reduce costs by opening the payments market to new entrants, 
including non-bank institutions. Further intensification of competition will benefit consumers and 
banks as well as various other stakeholders. It is also seen as the foundation of the Single European 
Payments Area which is to be launched by 1 January 2008. Pending the formal adoption by the 
Council, member states are to implement the Directive no later than 1 November 2009. 
The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) – encompassing more than 40 measures aimed at achieving 
greater integration of financial services across the EU – has not yet had a major impact on payment 
systems. This is not surprising, given that the integration of some of these services, such as retail banking 
or mortgages, has also not lived up to the expectations invested in them. Seven years after the Lisbon 
Council adopted the FSAP to harmonise existing regulations, national rules are still heavily fragmented 
across the EU member states, especially in the case of payment services. Currently, there are geographical 
boundaries of existing payment services due to high transactions costs, which seriously hamper or even 
prevent cross-border trade. In order to secure the EU economy’s growth potential and competitiveness, 
there is an urgent need to focus attention on financial services. Taking into consideration that payment 
transactions amounting to €52 trillion in total value are currently being carried out in the EU each year, 
the Directive tackles a market with great savings potential for the EU. These savings are estimated to be 
at least as high as €50 billion per year for the EU economy. With the Payment Services Directive, the 
European Commission aims to address issues of market inefficiencies, lack of competition and perceived 
stagnating product quality. 
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It is anticipated that the introduction of a simplified and harmonised set of legal standards 
will bring greater national and cross-border competition, because it paves the way for a 
level playing field and allows a new generation of (non-banking) financial service 
providers to enter the market. Furthermore, clarity with regard to the players’ rights and obligations is 
vital for the smooth functioning of the financial market. The PSD spells out both the players’ rights and 
obligations and the objective of increased market transparency for providers and users. The Directive 
explicitly focuses on non-cash payments: the Commission estimates that a reduction of expensive cash 
transactions (amounting to 60-70% of the total cost of the payment system) in favour of greater use of 
more cost-efficient electronic services would substantially cut overall costs, and thus stimulate consumer 
spending and economic growth. 
 
THE PROBLEM: MARKET FRAGMENTATION ALONG NATIONAL BORDERS 
Divergent legal settings in the 27 member states not only introduce price rigidities and (unjustifiable) 
differences into national payment services, but they also create significant impediments for players who 
are interested in offering their services across member states. The same holds for potential new entrants to 
the market for payment services – such as supermarkets, telecommunications providers and other non-
bank institutions. 
Differences in the price and quality of services are understood to be an indicator of efficiency 
discrepancies and market fragmentation along national lines. Studies by the European Commission reveal 
that differences in prices for payment services are currently as high as a factor of 1:8, with Italy and 
Germany leading the list of the EU countries with the most expensive services. Merchant fees in the range 
of 2.5% to 3.1% in Portugal, Czech Republic and Hungary are substantially higher than in Sweden and 
Finland, where only one-third or a quarter of that amount is charged. The results do not seem to be much 
different when analysing cardholder fees: while fee discrepancies between the two main credit card 
brands within a country are small, the opposite is true for the cross-border comparison. A large amount of 
countries are situated above the international average fee of €23 and €24 for MasterCard and Visa, 
respectively.  
Highly divergent fees charged for the issuing of a credit card are an indicator of a lack of competition. 
It is important to note that significant discrepancies in prices still exist even if national peculiarities and 
historical developments are accounted for. Studies such as Kleimeier & Sander
1 show that prices will 
eventually converge following further integration of the market, although they may never become fully 
equal, as might be assumed by the ‘law of one price’. Additional evidence of market concentration can be 
found in the high profitability of issuing cards, where an average profit-to-cost ratio of 65% for credit 
cards and 47% for debit cards can be observed.  
Systems dominated by highly vertically integrated players as well as joint ventures between local banks 
impose structural barriers and effectively impede intensity of competition that would be necessary to 
move towards greater cost-efficiency. While the markets in Spain and Portugal still feature a highly 
integrated supply side, the Netherlands successfully de-integrated its system, resulting in lower merchant 
fees. Technical incompatibility of national standards is a major obstacle to players wishing to offer 
services across European markets. Further, there are behavioural barriers. For instance, market 
incumbents agree to create artificially large differentials in interchange fees in order to make market entry 
of foreign banks more expensive and difficult. According to the Commission, this tactic seems to be 
employed in Austria and Portugal.  
                                                 
1 Stefanie Kleimeier and Harald Sander, Consumer Credit Rates in the Eurozone: Evidence on the Emergence on a Single Retail 
Banking Market, ECRI Research Report No. 2, January 2002. E 
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Similarly, the refusal of established players to grant access to clearing facilities for 
potential new entrants, thereby preventing the rise of new competitors constitutes a 
barrier to the market, foremost in the UK, Finland and Ireland. A market analysis of one 
part of the payment system – the acquisition of credit cards –by means of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
Index showed significant signs of market concentration. The index is based on squaring and adding up the 
players’ market shares. Results below 1,000 points indicate low concentration, whereas markets with 
more than 2,000 points are considered to be concentrated. This index is below 2,000 only for Spain, while 
results of over 8.000 points are found for a number of EU countries, justifying the PSD’s drive for 
improved competition. 
NETWORK ECONOMICS AND PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
From the standpoint of economic theory, the existing problems can be traced back to features of payment 
system markets that are closely related to those of network industries. Networks consist of compatible 
nodes and links and are subject in most cases to critical mass phenomena, path dependency, economies of 
scale and scope, lock-in and non-linear growth. An understanding of the peculiarities of network 
economics is crucial in order to analyse the industrial organisation and functioning of the payment system 
market. For instance, economies of scale and scope as well as non-linear growth typically lead to highly 
concentrated industry structures. Compatibility, on the other hand, can in many cases only be reached by 
cooperation among competitors. Thus, it is important to point out that some cooperation in terms of 
payment systems infrastructure and standards needs to be accepted in order to ensure the smooth 
functioning of a single financial market.  
In fact, studies show that the underlying network effects keep competition within limits, as necessary 
economies of scale and critical mass requirements cannot be achieved without some cooperation. But 
there are other reasons for the current fragmentation along national lines. For instance, costs or technical 
incompatibility as well as the (still) low demand for international transactions reduce the incentive to 
invest across borders. In the case of low demand for international transactions, the necessary economies 
of scale are not reached to justify the expense.  
Consumers, on the other hand, are typically characterized by inertia and will not demand new payment 
instruments if the number of consumers of the new product is not sufficiently high. These so-called 
‘demand-side’ economies of scale (or network effects) signify that an increasing number of users of a 
certain product (such as a new payment service) will directly increase the utility of other consumers of the 
same service. In addition, switching seems to generate unreasonably high financial and non-financial 
costs. Switching costs lock the consumer into the existing (national) system and generate market power 
for the incumbent on the supply side as prices can theoretically be raised by the amount of switching 
costs. One of the main questions is whether providers have an incentive to act as first mover in building a 
pan-European network or if the risk of sunk costs leads to a deadlock situation where systems remain 
fragmented. If the benefits of the PSD are to be successfully reaped, regulation needs to carefully address 
network economic issues.  
TACKLING THE PROBLEMS WITH DEREGULATION 
The main strategic objectives of the PSD are three-fold. First, by removing legal barriers, it is intended to 
create a level playing field for payment service providers, including non-bank institutions. This increases 
the number of providers that are in direct competition with each other. A further intention is to reduce the 
number of actual payment infrastructures, thereby encouraging the established players to lower prices in 
order to successfully compete for customers and reducing possible customer lock-in and market power. In 
addition, competition is one of the main drivers for efficiency and – highly correlated – (cost-cutting) 
innovation. Progressive improvement of existing systems will lead to reduced processing costs, allowing 
payment services providers to further lower charged fees.  E 
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Non-financial aspects also need to be considered: processing time and security matters 
as well as general consumer convenience and service quality which depend on the 
willingness of/and incentives given to the supply side to innovate. Secondly, by 
increasing market transparency for providers and users, standardised conditions for payment services will 
allow consumers to faster calculate and compare services offered in the market. On the so-called ‘D+1’ 
basis, for example, the service provider is obliged to execute transactions without currency conversion by 
the end of the next business day. Furthermore, the ‘full amount principle’ requires that the full amount 
stated in the transaction be credited without any kind of deduction. Providers, on the other hand, will be 
able to profit from the possibility to enter foreign markets and offer their services, being subject to the 
same set of information requirements existing in their home market. This will create a more efficient and 
wider European payment services market. 
Thirdly, in order to tackle national fragmentation of markets and to reduce protection of national 
markets from outside competition, a standardised set of rights and obligations of providers and users is to 
be introduced. With the aim of providing a high level of consumer protection, 27 national rules will be 
replaced by one set of legal standards on which consumers and providers can rely when demanding or 
supplying payment services. Alongside these objectives, the PSD supports the creation of the SEPA 
(Single European Payment Area), laying the necessary legal foundation and encouraging the European 
banking industry to deepen its efforts and complete its work in this self-regulatory industry initiative. 
SEPA, which is overseen by the European Payments Council, is intended to allow citizens to make 
payments in euro within Europe, whether between or within the national boundaries under the same basic 
conditions, rights and obligations. 
Among the most contentious issues, however, are the minimum capital requirements imposed on the 
new generation of payment services providers, the so-called non-bank ‘payment institutions’. To avoid 
overburdening these potential market entrants, less stringent supervision and regulation are to be applied. 
The European Commission states that smaller capital requirements for (small) payment institutions are 
necessary, accounting for the differences in the business models and the risks between banks and other 
payment service providers. The PSD gives the authorities of the member states the choice between three 
different methods of calculating the minimum capital requirements, allowing them to increase or reduce 
these requirements by 20%, depending on the quality of the payment institution’s risk management. 
However, the gap between the minimum levels of required initial capital is substantial: €5 million for 
banks vs. a mere € 20,000 for new payment institutions.  
 
THE NEXT BIG CHALLENGE  
Two years of intensive negotiations have ended with the adoption of the Payment Services Directive by 
the European Parliament in the first reading. The process to create an integrated single market in financial 
services is therefore one step closer to implementation. Before being transposed into national law by the 
Member States, it now needs to be formally adopted by the Council. Although the matter is highly 
technical and complex, there seems to be the political agreement that payment services must be integrated 
in Europe. This is important for an efficient functioning of financial services. In addition, competitive 
disadvantages through regulations should disappear so that there is a level playing field for competitors.  
The consensus reached on the PSD is a major step towards more harmonised payment systems in 
Europe. Although, there is a broad consensus about the possible benefits, the next big challenge will be 
the implementation. Also in the future, however, preserving competition in the area of payment systems 
will be an ongoing effort as the peculiarities of network features induce concentration. Nevertheless, a 
level playing field might attract a higher number of players, and in the best-case scenario, it will create a 
truly pan-European market. E 
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